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Abstract. Farm-level Census data and county-level income shock data reveal that past 
unexpected income shocks affect the rate of change in average farm size. Average farm size 
increases more quickly in counties experiencing negative income shocks as compared to counties 
experiencing positive income shocks. This result cannot be explained by perfect-market models, 
which predict farm size should adjust according to changes in the relative prices of labor and 
capital. We posit a model wherein cash flows affect liquidity, which in turn affects farm 
borrowing and capital costs.  In the model, farms that do not face liquidity constraints benefit 
from negative income shocks because they reduce land values, so these farms expand while 
liquidity-constrained farms contract.  Observed farm consolidation patterns and farm exit rates 
are consistent with a model wherein liquidity constraints affect small farms more than large 
farms. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the relationship between risk and farm consolidation by examining how 
farms of different sizes cope with unexpected income shocks. We ask whether small farms are 
affected disproportionately during periods of economic decline, or whether large farms—which 
may be more leveraged and thereby face greater financial exposure—are more vulnerable to 
income fluctuations.  The differential ability of farmers to cope with income risk could have 
important implications for farm structure, and could help determine the consequences of 
governmental policies that reduce farm income risk. 
Neoclassical theory provides little help in answering these questions because income 
cycles have little to do with economic fundamentals such as long-run trends in relative input 
prices. An influential paper by Kislev and Peterson (1982) shows that growth in farm-labor 
prices relative to farm-machinery prices can explain farm-size growth.  As labor has become 
more expensive relative to capital, farms have substituted capital inputs for labor inputs, which is 
commensurate with larger farm sizes.  Other work suggests that technological change, economies 
of scale, government programs, aging farm operators, and human capital growth might also help 
to explain farm-size growth (Cochrane, 1958; Tweeten, 1982; Sumner and Leiby; 1987; 
Massow, et. al., 1992; Harrington, et. al., 1995; Zepeda, 1995; Evenson and Huffman, 2001, 
among others).   
The goal of this paper is to develop a better understanding about how income shocks 
influence the timing of farm size changes—the short-run dynamics that lead toward the long-run 
equilibrium governed by economic fundamentals.  We proceed under the hypothesis that income 
cycles—booms and busts in farm incomes—play a role in consolidation dynamics.  Do farms 
consolidate in good times when prices and yields are high and farms are flush with cash, and 05/23/02  3 
have ready access to credit?  Or does consolidation occur in bad times when cash-thirsty farms 
are forced to contract or sell out, allowing more liquid firms to expand?  
In line with the way we have posed our questions, we develop a theoretical model 
wherein liquidity constraints are important to farm-size dynamics. The model extends Kislev and 
Peterson by allowing for capital market imperfections and for two farm types distinguished by 
net worth.   In the model, a farm’s cost of capital depends on its net worth. Under this 
assumption negative income shocks lower the net worth of a farm making it more costly for the 
farm to obtain financing. After a negative income shock, land prices fall, net-worth-constrained 
farms shrink and unconstrained farms expand.   If small farms are liquidity constrained and large 
farms are not, then negative income shocks cause borrowing costs to rise more for farms with 
low net worth.  In this case, bad times provide cheap expansion opportunities for big farms, and 
average farm size increases more in the bad times than good.  On the other hand, if large farms 
are constrained and small farms are not, then the opposite is true – average farm size increases 
more during good times. 
We empirically test between these two hypotheses by examining how farm size responds 
to exogenous yield shocks.  Yield shocks are large, unexpected, transitory, and have a large 
spatial variance.  These characteristics provide a natural experiment that allows us to identify 
how income variation influences consolidation, separate from aggregate changes in prices, 
technology, government programs, or other economic fundamentals that might drive farm 
consolidation.  Transitory county-level income shocks are derived from estimated county-level 
yield shocks and state prices.  For each county, we derive an average annual income shock for 
the four to five year period between each agricultural Census.  We then examine how farm exits 
rates, entry rates, and growth correlate with the identified past income shocks. 05/23/02  4 
We find that greater recent negative income shocks experienced in a county are positively 
associated with an increase in the average farm size in a county.  In addition, negative income 
shocks are associated with higher rate of exit of small farms and a lower exit rate of large farms. 
Moreover, we find that the largest farms increase their share of total land more after bad shocks, 
while of land controlled by smaller farms declines more after bad shocks.  These findings 
provide support for the hypothesis that small farms are liquidity constrained and large farms are 
not.  The model and empirical findings are consistent with previous empirical work on credit 
constraints (Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998) and findings that rural-to-urban migration is 
negatively correlated with land prices (Barkley, 1990). 
Our model and empirical results can be contrasted with earlier work by Johnson (1947), 
Quance and Tweeten (1972), and Shertz et al (1979), in which risk and government programs are 
said to influence farm consolidation through what Harrington and Reinsel (1995) describe as the 
“risk-leverage mechanism.”  According to this mechanism, small farms have greater yield 
variability than large farms, and at the same time larger farms are more likely to participate in 
programs that reduce price risk.
1  Because larger farms face lower yield and price risk, they are 
better able than small farms to leverage their assets to expand production during prosperous 
economic periods.  However, according to this view, highly-leveraged large farms suffered 
disproportionately during in the 1980’s farm crisis, when interest rates were high and product 
prices low.  Farms that entered the 1980’s with less financial exposure were able to exploit 
bargains created when highly leveraged farms were forced to liquidate their land and machinery 
holdings. Although we are not aware of a formalization of the risk-leverage mechanism, the 
                                                 
1 In recent years, large farms have also more likely to participate in programs that reduce yield risk, such as federally 
subsidized crop insurance programs. 05/23/02  5 
theory seems to predict greater consolidation (growth in average farm size) during good times as 
opposed to bad times. 
 
Liquidity and Net Worth  
Credit market imperfections (resulting perhaps from adverse selection or moral hazard in 
financial markets) may raise firms' costs of borrowing external funds. When this is the case, 
firms find it cheaper to finance investment using cash on hand, which makes financial liquidity 
and internal net worth important determinants of investment. (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  Empirical studies that have estimated reduced-
form investment equations find that cash flow is significant, which is usually interpreted as 
evidence of significant financial constraints on the firm.
2  Other empirical studies have used an 
Euler equation approach to examine the role of imperfect financial markets in firms' economic 
decisions (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Gilchrist, 1991; Himmelberg, 1990; Hubbard, 
Kashyap, and Whited, 1994; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 1994, Sharp, 1994). This work has 
shown that models with financial constraints explain the data better than neoclassical investment 
models with perfect capital markets, which represents further evidence of borrowing constraints. 
The empirical literature that has found liquidity important for investment decisions of 
manufacturing firms suggests that liquidity constraints may also be important in agriculture, 
which is both a risky industry and one comprised largely of partnerships and sole-
proprietorships.  Farm-households normally hold a disproportionate share of wealth in farm 
capital; and on-average they tend to consume a smaller portion of their income than do non-farm 
households (Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992; Carroll, 1997).  These patterns suggest that 
precautionary saving, self-finance, and consequently liquidity constraints are important features 05/23/02  6 
in farm business decision making.  These constraints may impose risk-coping costs to farmers 
regardless of their preferences and ability to smooth consumption.  Recent work (Roberts and 
Key, 2002) provides evidence that unanticipated yield shocks affect subsequent crop planting 
decisions and may suggest that liquidity constraints are important to agricultural production 
choices. 
The effect of liquidity constraints can be modeled by an interest rate (cost of capital) that 
depends on a farm’s net worth.  Accordingly, an increase in net worth due to a positive income 
shock – caused perhaps by unexpectedly high yields or prices – allows farmers to self-finance 
production rather than use more expensive external finance.  In contrast, a decline in net worth 
resulting from a negative income shock means farmers cannot self-finance and must turn to 
relatively expensive external financing to fund production and investment.   
Incorporating liquidity constraints into a farm structure model that has only one 
representative farm cannot explain observed patterns of farm consolidation.  As can be shown 
using the model developed in the next section, with only one farm type, a change in capital costs 
(resulting from an income shock) would be capitalized into the price of land, perfectly offsetting 
the increase or decrease in profits resulting from the capital price change.  Since capital costs and 
land prices offset each other, income shocks do not change farm profits, so identical farms to 
have no incentive to alter farm size.  This non-informative result is overturned when we consider 
two farm types where one type is liquidity constrained and the other type is not, and where the 
cost of capital is correlated with farm size.   
In a model with two farm types where only one type faces liquidity constraints, negative 
income shocks may cause an increase or a decrease in farm consolidation depending on the 
relative size of the farm facing the liquidity constraint. As we will see in section 4, farm size 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 This conclusion is not accepted universally: see for example Gomes (2001), Sargent (1980), and Shapiro (1986). 05/23/02  7 
increases more in regions experiencing recent negative income shocks, and increases less (or 
decreases) in regions experiencing recent positive income shocks.  The model presented in the 




Let there be two types of representative farms that differ in their access to capital: 
“unconstrained” farms that can borrow an unlimited quantity at a market interest rate r , and 
“constrained” farms that finance capital at an interest rate  () C C W r  that is decreasing in net worth: 
0 '< C r .  An income shock, caused perhaps by an unexpected weather-induced yield fluctuation is 
equivalent to a change in net worth.   
Taking all prices, including the price of labor w and the price of land v, as given, farms 
choose capital, labor, and land inputs to maximize profits.  Profit maximization results in profit 
functions  () v w r U , , π  and  () v w rC C , , π  that are decreasing in input prices: 
 


































We can also write the input demand functions:  () v w r KU , ,,   () v w r LU , ,,   () v w r AU , , a n d  
() v w r K C C , ,,   () v w r L C C , ,,   () v w r A C C , , , which are decreasing in own price: 
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Following Kislev and Peterson, capital is used in fixed proportions with land. That is:  
 
(1)  U U mK A =  and  C C mK A = . 
 
We allow for entry and exit of farms by assuming there is a large pool of potential 
unconstrained farmers and potential constrained farmers.  Farmers of each type have 
heterogeneous opportunity costs.  Farmers exit farming if their farm profits fall below their 
opportunity costs, and enter farming if profits rise above their opportunity costs.  For example, 








C OC > π . Because there are a large 
number of farmers and opportunity costs are heterogeneous, the number of farms of each type 




















Finally, let there be a fixed amount of arable land  A .  The land rental rate v adjusts to 
clear the land market, and is defined implicitly by: 
 
(2)  ()( ) ()( ) A v w r A N v w r A N U U U C C C C = + , , , , π π ;  () ( ) v w r v w r U C C , , , , , π π . 
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Comparative Statics 
How do the number and size of constrained and unconstrained farms and average farm 
size change with an unexpected change in income?  An income shock increases or decreases the 
net worth of both types of farms, which alters the capital costs  () C C W r  of constrained farms.  A 
change in capital costs for constrained farms has implications for the profit maximizing choices 
of both constrained and unconstrained farms. Hence, to determine the effect of an income shock 
on the number and size of constrained and unconstrained farms we need to examine how a 
change in  C r  affects optimal decisions. 
First, consider how the constrained-farm capital rate alters the size and number of 
unconstrained farms.  A change in  C r  affects unconstrained farms via the land market: an 
increase in  C r  reduces the demand for land by constrained farms, and since there is a fixed 
amount of land, the land rental rate v falls.  We show that  0 <
C dr
dv  in appendix A.1.  A lower 
land rental rate resulting from an increase in  C r  raises unconstrained-farm profits, this in turn 
increases the number of unconstrained farms.  Hence, the number of unconstrained farms 
increase with the constrained-farm capital rate: 
 























Because an increase in the constrained-farm capital rate reduces the price of land, the 
optimal size of an unconstrained farm also increases with  C r : 
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With more unconstrained farms each cultivating more land, the total amount of land farmed by 
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Now consider how the number and size of constrained farms change with  C r .   
Constrained-farm profits determine the number of constrained farms.  The constrained-farm 



































The constrained-farm capital rate also determines the size of constrained farms directly and 


























 05/23/02  11 












∂ π π 1














It follows that (4) and (5) can be rewritten: 
 



























































. It follows from (4’) and (5’) that in an increase in 
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Implications for Farm Structure 
If small farms are liquidity constrained and large farms are not, then the model 
demonstrates that a negative income shock increases the cost of capital for small farms, reducing 
the number and size of small farms and increasing the number and size of big farms.  It follows 05/23/02  12 
that the average farm size increases.  On the other hand, if small farms were unconstrained and 
large farms were constrained, then a negative income shock results in the opposite effect – the 
number and size of small farms increase and the number and size of big farms decrease and 
average farm size falls. 
  Figure 1 traces through the effects of a negative profit shock for the case where small 
farms are constrained and large farms are not.  A negative profit shock raises the cost of 
borrowing for liquidity-constrained small farms. The relatively higher price of capital for small 
farms, reflected in the steeper isocost curve in the upper-right quadrant, reduces the quantity of 
capital demanded by small farms from 
0
C K  to 
1
C K . Because capital and land are used in fixed 
proportions, less capital implies a smaller farm size for small farms as land shifts from 
0
C A  to 
1
C A .  The higher price of capital for small farms also lowers profits for small farms, which in turn 
reduces the number of small farms from 
0
C N  to 
1
C N . As shown in the figure in the lower-left 
quadrant, the reduction in the number and size of small farms implies that total land cultivated by 
small farms shrinks from 
0 0
C CA N  to 
1 1
C CA N . 
Yield shocks affect large unconstrained farms through the land market. The drop in 
demand for land by small farms results in a lower land rental rate, shown in the upper quadrants 
of figure 1 as an increase in the slope of the isocost curve (the effective price of capital depends 
on the land price). Cheaper land raises the demand for land and capital by large farms, and raises 
profits for large farms.  As a result, large unconstrained farms increase in size from 
0
U A  to 
1
U A , 
and increase in number from 
0
U N  to 
1
U N , which results in an increase in total land cultivated by 
large farms from 
0 0
U U A N  to 
1 1
U U A N .  As shown in the lower-left quadrant, the increase in the land 
cultivated by unconstrained large farms equals the decrease in land cultivated by constrained 05/23/02  13 
small farms, so that the total amount of land in farming remains fixed: 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
U U C C U U C C A N A N A N A N A + = + = . 
 
3. Data and Methods 
Yield Shocks  
As an instrument for the change in net worth, we estimate the weighted average per acre income 
shock, 
t
i s  in county i and year t: 
 
























ij y  is the reported yield, 
t
ij y ˆ  is a predicted yield discussed below, 
t
ij l  is land harvested, and 
t
ij p  is the price for crop j in county i in year t. All data are from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Service at the county level, except prices, which are at the state level.  Crops used 
include barley, corn (grain), cotton, hay, oats, rice, sorghum (grain), soybean, and wheat.   
Predicted yields 
t
ij y ˆ  were derived from yield trend estimates made separately for each 
county and each crop using a non-parametric procedure “loess” -- short for local-polynomial 
regression. By estimating separate non-parametric and non-linear yield trends for each county, 
we reduce the chance of systematically confounding anticipated yield changes for unanticipated 
yield shocks.  For example, if we fit linear trends when the actual trend was a slight "S" shape, 
then yield shocks in the earlier periods would appear too negative and more recent periods would 
appear too positive. 05/23/02  14 
  We use yield shocks as our source of identification because they are large, transitory, and 
vary widely over both time and space.  These shocks are unlikely to be correlated with other 
variables that may drive structural change, such as price trends or business-cycle fluctuations in 
interest rates and wages.  Yield shocks can be contrasted with price shocks, which tend to persist 
over time, and therefore affect fundamental profitability as well as net worth.  Because our goal 
is to assess the importance of net worth separately from other farm-size determinants, and 
because we are skeptical of our ability to accurately account for all such factors, we require an 
instrument that is uncorrelated with these potentially missing factors. 
  Over any five-year period, our estimated income shocks are larger by about $20 per acre- 
year for the highest shock quartile as compared to the lowest quartile.  Over a five-year period 
between censuses, this amounts to about a $50,000 difference in net worth between an average 
“unlucky” farmer with 500 acres as compared to an average “lucky” farmer with the same 
acreage. 
 
Census of Agriculture Longitudinal Data 
The Census of Agriculture Longitudinal data is a collection of responses to a subset of 
questions from the Census of Agriculture for the years 1978, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. Each 
data record represents the responses from one farm operation in each of the five censuses.  
Consequently, the Longitudinal file allows researchers to track changes in particular operations 
between 1978 and 1997 at four or five year intervals.  There are approximately 4.5 million 
operations reporting for at least one of the five survey years.  The census data, which include 
almost all US farms, are maintained by NASS and stored in their Kansas City office. 05/23/02  15 
The nine crops included in the income shock estimation include all of the most 
commonly produced commodities. In the analysis, we restrict the counties in the sample to those 
in which land harvested in the nine major commodities represented between 90 and 110% of the 
total land harvested in the county as measured by the census in 1987, 1992 and 1997.
3   We make 
this restriction so that the estimated income shock accurately reflects the actual average income 
shock at the county level.  We also omitted farms for which the owner did not reside in the same 
county as the farm.  Restricting the Census information in this way limits the total number of 
counties to 765, which reduces the total sample size to between 497,363 to 660,392 operations, 
depending on the Census year.  Figure 2 shows the location of the counties included in the 
estimation.  Table 1 reports summary statistics on the size and number of these farms for each 
Census year. 
For the subset of operations we study, the Longitudinal data file reports an average entry 
rate of over 20 percent and an average exit rate of over 30 percent.  Some of these entering and 
exiting farm operations likely result from an imperfect merging of farm operations across Census 
years, non-response in one or more years, or because of changes in the Census definition of what 
constitutes a farm operation, and therefore who received a survey form.  It will be important to 
keep these issues in mind when interpreting the results. 
 
Methods 
Our empirical approach is to simply to compare how farms of different sizes respond to 
income shocks.  We first merged the restricted Census data with the county-level farm shock 
data and split the sample based on quintiles of the past 5-year average income shock (4 years for 
                                                 
3 The reported land harvested in the commodity crops (from NASS) occasionally exceeded that recorded in the 
Census.  This could have resulted from doublecropping - two crops being planted in one field per year.  05/23/02  16 
the 1978-82 Census years).  For each income shock quintile, we found the change in average 
farm size between Censuses.  We then split the data into three groups depending on whether a 
farm operation exited between two consecutive Censuses, entered between two Census years, or 
was present in two consecutive Censuses.  We refer to these groups as exiting farms, entering 
farms, and ongoing farms, respectively.  Each of these data sets was then parsed into twenty-five 
groups based on the income shock quintile and the size class of the farm.  The farm sizes we 
examined were 10-99 acres, 100-199 acres, 200-399 acres, 400-799 acres, and farms 800 acres 
and larger.  In this way we can examine how farms of different sizes respond (on average) to past 
income shocks.   
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the average change in the county-average farm size depending on quintile of the 
5-year average income shock.  The table shows there is a statistically significant difference in the 
average farm size change between counties experiencing bad and good shocks.  The bottom and 
next to bottom quintiles of county-years experiencing the worst income shocks had farm size 
increase by an average of 23.9 and 21.1 acres, respectively, in the previous 5 year period. In 
contrast, the top and next-to-top quintiles of counties experiencing the largest positive income 
shocks had average farm size expand by only 8.9 acres, and contract by 2.3 acres, respectively.  
Relative to the average yearly growth in farm size of about 4.6 acres, these differences are 
substantial. 
Table 3 reports the average farm size changes and standard errors among ongoing farms 
by income shock quintile.  The smaller two farm classes (10-100 and 100-200 acres) show 
greater average farm size growth following positive shocks as compared to negative shocks.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Doublecropping is consistent with the approach used here to compute per-acre income shocks.  05/23/02  17 
This difference is statistically significant between the lowest quintile and the other quintiles, but 
the other differences are not statistically significant.  The larger two farm class sizes (400-800 
and > 800 acres) generally show greater average farm size growth following negative shocks as 
compared to positive shocks.  The pattern is clearer, however, for the largest farm class size.  
Differences between the two highest quintiles and lowest two quintiles are statistically 
significant.  The middle sized farm class (200-400 acres) shows greater growth during good and 
bad shocks as compared to the average shock, however these differences are marginally 
significant. 
Tables 4 and 5 respectively report the exit and entry rates and standard errors of farms by 
farm-class and income shock quintile.  Differences between exit rates decrease with the income 
shocks for small farms and medium farms, and increase and then decrease for the largest farms. 
For the lowest income shock quintile, the exit rates are highest for the smallest three class sizes, 
but exit rates are the lowest for the largest farms. The standard errors are small so that 
differences between quintiles generally are statistically significant.  Figure 3 plots these exit 
rates.  
Although entering farms did not experience the past income shocks that we identified, 
our model predicts that entrance rate should never-the-less be influenced via the effect of shocks 
on land prices.  Across all land size categories, we should expect greater entry following bad 
income shocks than following good shocks; however, unlike the exit rates, the entry rates show 
no clear pattern and generally are not statistically different between income shock quintiles. 
The rates reported in Tables 4 and 5 must be interpreted with caution.  It seems 
implausible that over 40 percent of farms in the smallest class size exit from agriculture every 
five years.  Many of the exits are likely misclassfied as exits due to the data issues described 05/23/02  18 
above.  The misclassification rate, however, is unlikely to be correlated with income shock 
quintiles, so differences between quintiles are probably real.  Thus, the exit rate for small farms 
in the lowest shock quintile is about 3.5 points less than the highest shock quintile.  One basis for 
comparing this value can be derived from the total number of farms in each size class reported in 
Table 1.  The number of farms in the smallest class size has decreased by an average of about 
1.2% per year over the sample period.  By comparison, the 3.5% seems economically important. 
Finally, Table 6 reports the change between Censuses in the share of total farmland 
controlled by farms in each size category depending on the income shock quintile.  Changes 
were computed by subtracting the percent of land farmed in each size category at the county 
level in the current period from the value in the previous period. The averages presented in the 
table were weighted by the amount of land in each county. Figure 4 displays the changes 
reported in Table 6.   As shown in table and figure, on average the share of the total land farmed 
by the largest farms (more than 800 acres) increased between Censuses, regardless of past 
income shocks.  In contrast, the share of the total land farmed by the four smallest farm 
categories fell between Censuses, on average, regardless of the shock quintile.  
The relationship between changing farm structure and income shocks is apparent in Table 
6 and Figure 4.  The largest farms increased their share of total land the more after bad shocks 
compared to after average or above average shocks (for each size group, there was no significant 
difference in the levels of change between the top three shock quintiles). The opposite was true 
for the four smallest size groups: these farms experienced a larger decline in their share of total 
land after bad shocks compared to after average or above average shocks.  
 05/23/02  19 
5. Conclusions 
Our empirical findings lend support to the idea that income shocks do influence farm structure 
and are consistent with a model wherein smaller farms are more liquidity constrained than large 
farms.  We find that smaller farms are more likely to exit in bad times than the good times and 
the biggest farms are least likely to exit in the bad times.  In addition, small ongoing farms grow 
more following good shocks than bad while large farms grow more following bad shocks and 
less following good shocks. On average, the share of land controlled by the largest farms 
increases most, and that controlled by the smallest farms decreases least, following bad income 
shocks.  We observe no clear pattern with respect to entering farms. 
There are several reasons why larger farms may be less likely to face liquidity constraints 
than smaller farms, which could explain observed consolidation patterns.  Large farms may save 
at a higher rate, allowing them to more effectively smooth production over time via saving and 
dissaving. Alternatively, owners of large farms may have more diversified portfolios, which 
allows them spread their risks across a variety of investments. Large farms may also have had 
greater participation in ‘counter-cyclical’ farm policies, which include price supports and safety 
net programs such as subsidized crop insurance. Counter-cyclical payments would maintain net 
worth during periods of low yields, allowing farmers to avoid costly external financing. 
A recurring debate in agricultural policy concerns the appropriate design of governmental 
agricultural programs—not just the size of income transfers to the sector, but whether payments 
should take the form of lump-sum transfers or whether they should provide income safety nets or 
augment producers’ risk management tools. In the 2002 farm bill debate, attention turned away 
from the lump-sum payments that were instituted with the 1996 farm bill and toward new (or 
resurrected) types of counter-cyclical farm policies. One motive for the increased interest in 05/23/02  20 
safety net and risk management programs has been the perception that farmers – and particularly 
smaller family farms – are vulnerable to income shocks caused by weather or price fluctuations.  
Others believe that counter-cyclical and other types of government programs disproportionately 
benefit large farms and contribute to the increasing concentration of agricultural production (e.g., 
Becker, 2002; Lancaster, 2001).  
The fact that negative income shocks are associated an increase in farm concentration 
suggests that programs that promote an economic safety net for farmers could influence the rate 
of farm consolidation. The findings of this paper suggest that the effects of these programs would 
depend on how they altered the ability of farmers of different sizes to cope with risk.  Programs 
that targeted small-scale operations could potentially reduce the rate of farm consolidation during 
periods of economic stress. 
Although the results of the paper suggest that certain farm policies could reduce the rate 
of farm consolidation, the results do not imply that this would necessarily enhance economic 
efficiency. Economists dating back to Hayek and Schumpeter have argued that the process of 
bankruptcy, liquidation, and reallocation of factors during periods of economic recession serves a 
useful function – reallocating resources to uses that are more efficient.  Some modern economists 
see recessions as a good time to undergo necessary economic restructuring because recessions 
offer a period of relatively low opportunity costs (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998). However, 
concentrating liquidations during recessions may be lead to higher costs due to the higher rates 
of unemployment that occur during a downturn (Hall, 1995).  Analogously, agricultural 
consolidation that is driven by shifts in technology or factor prices may occur more rapidly 
during periods of low prices or be regionally concentrated after periods of low yields.  This 05/23/02  21 
consolidation could lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, and programs that impede 
this transformation may be costly.   05/23/02  22 
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Figure 1. The Effect of a Negative Income Shock on Farm Size for the Case Where Large Farms 
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Figure 2. Location of Counties Included in Study. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Census Years in Counties Used in Study. 
 
  1978 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Total Farms 
660392 627230 562014 507885 497363 
Mean (Acres)  344.5  362.31 390.85 428.66 431.53 
       
Farm Size (Acres)  -Number of Farms- 
<10  35415 39365 38599 33093 28700 
10-100  199922 193500 168641 153319 164723 
100-200 142182  125148  109299  94897  92459 
200-400 144063  128370  108169  93061  84521 
400-800  89714 87764 80456 72962 65347 
>800  49096 53083 56850 60553 61613 
    
Farm Size (Acres)  -Percent of Farms- 
<10  5.36 6.28 6.87 6.52 5.77 
10-100  30.27 30.85 30.01 30.19 33.12 
100-200  21.53 19.95 19.45 18.68 18.59 
200-400  21.81 20.47 19.25 18.32 16.99 
400-800  13.58 13.99 14.32 14.37 13.14 
>800  7.43  8.46  10.12 11.92 12.39 
       
Farm Size (Acres)  -Percent of Farmland- 
<10  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
10-100  4.46 4.17 3.76 3.40 3.67 
100-200  9.00 7.91 7.14 6.23 6.13 
200-400  17.75 15.89 13.84 12.02 11.03 
400-800  21.35 21.06 20.23 18.61 16.97 
>800  47.38 50.90 54.96 59.67 62.13 
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 Table 2.  Average Farm Size Change between Censuses for Different Income Shock Quintiles 
 















($/Acre)       
       
       
Change in 
Average Farm 
Size  (Acres)  23.90 21.23 11.07 -2.32  8.92 
Std. Err.  2.62 4.14 5.51 5.22 4.14 
       
N  631 605 608 605 607 
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Table 3. Change in Farm Size by Farm Size Category and Income Shock Quintile 
 














10-100  -29.15 -25.02 -24.01 -23.98 -23.16 
  (1.42) (1.29) (1.53) (1.73) (1.62) 
100-200  -25.91 -22.15 -24.71 -22.79 -19.68 
  (1.40) (1.75) (4.33) (3.45) (2.14) 
200-400  -9.75 -8.82  -13.08  -12.55  -7.02 
  (1.35) (2.61) (2.61) (2.32) (1.64) 
400-800  34.63 36.03 20.55 16.77 32.09 
  (1.80) (2.43) (4.59) (3.40) (2.05) 
>800  226.49 222.64 215.79 188.36 182.88 
  (6.21) (7.14)  (10.45)  (7.00) (9.38) 
 
Note: Change in farm size is defined as the average change in the number of acres harvested in 
the county in between consecutive Censuses. The standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Rate of Exit from Farming by Farm Size Category and Income Shock Quintile 
 














10-100  0.4348 0.4220 0.4162 0.4115 0.3987 
  (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0000) 
100-200  0.3799 0.3680 0.3630 0.3573 0.3474 
  (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0036) 
200-400  0.3285 0.3247 0.3246 0.3208 0.2880 
  (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0040) 
400-800  0.2846 0.2877 0.2905 0.2881 0.2532 
  (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0045) 
>800  0.2599 0.2763 0.2866 0.2802 0.2682 
  (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0038) 
 
Note: County rate of exit is defined as the number of farms in county that reported in the 
previous Census but did not report in the current Census divided by the total number of farms 
reporting in the previous Census. The standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 05/23/02  32 
Table 5. Rate of Entrance into Farming by Farm Size Category and Income Shock Quintile 
 














10-100  0.3440 0.3398 0.3430 0.3636 0.3271 
  (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0050) 
100-200  0.2451 0.2540 0.2528 0.2577 0.2222 
  (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0044) 
200-400  0.1950 0.2092 0.2114 0.2156 0.1860 
  (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0042) 
400-800  0.1766 0.1844 0.2014 0.2087 0.1855 
  (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0043) 
>800  0.2324 0.2436 0.2439 0.2395 0.2384 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0043) 
 
Note: County rate of entrance is defined as the number of farms in county that reported in the 
current Census but did not report in the previous Census divided by the total number of farms 
reporting in the current Census. The standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Change in Share of Total Farmland by Farm Size Category 
 














10-100  -0.196 -0.195 -0.116 -0.024 -0.090 
  (0.032) (0.036) (0.028) (0.030) (0.046) 
100-200  -0.874 -0.662 -0.456 -0.338 -0.422 
  (0.052) (0.053) (0.044) (0.045) (0.069) 
200-400  -2.687 -1.992 -1.264 -1.014 -0.862 
  (0.104) (0.109) (0.093) (0.086) (0.115) 
400-800  -2.385 -1.715 -0.927 -0.752 -1.328 
  (0.151) (0.134) (0.115) (0.116) (0.161) 
>800  6.141 4.572 2.766 2.130 2.709 
  (0.195) (0.183) (0.173) (0.162) (0.225) 
 
Note: The change in the share of total farmland is defined as the average change between Census 
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Figure 4. Change between Censuses in the Share of Total Farmland by Farm Size Category and 
Income Shock Quintile  
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